Employing data from 13 Latin American countries, we find that greater central bank independence is associated with lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market, and also with leaning-against-the-wind intervention. We also find that the structural reforms that occurred in Latin America mostly in the 1990s helped to reduce the need for foreign exchange intervention.
Introduction
Central bank independence to conduct monetary policy has been related to low inflation rates with no consequences to economic growth (Grilli et al., 1991; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Cukierman, 1992; Eijffinger and Haan, 1996; Jacome, 2001; Jacome and Vasquez, 2005) . Heightened independence can also be associated with lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market. Indeed a negative relationship between foreign exchange intervention and central bank independence has been found for 20 industrialized countries (Almekinders, 1995) in a study that employed both changes in currency reserves as proxies for intervention and the central bank independence index of Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) . The negative relationship also holds for the variability of intervention and independence. (Foreign exchange intervention surveys include Sarno and Taylor (2001) and Taylor (2004) .) So the relationship between foreign exchange intervention and central bank independence will be our concern in this paper.
We will taka data from Latin American countries and put forward an alternative methodology.
The usage of changes in reserves to proxy for intervention activity can be criticized on the basis that they are too noisy and that reserves can change for reasons having nothing to do with intervention. For instance, if the currency of a country depreciates, this will automatically increase the relative value of any foreign exchange holdings in a central bank's portfolio. In such a situation the positive correlation between intervention (proxied by reserve changes) and lack of central bank independence could be explained by the fact that countries with lesser independent central banks have more expansionary (and variable) monetary policy, which in turn leads to a more depreciating (and volatile) exchange rate, and therefore to larger (and more variable) foreign reserves.
Rather than relying on net foreign reserves, here we will take the policy rule ( )
to track intervention. In equation (1), i T is the target to the nominal interest rate.
Departures of the nominal exchange rate from its target are captured by the deviations of real exchange rate R from its PPP value of one. Equation (1) can be justified on the basis that a central bank's main concern in intervention activity is to counteract speculative nominal exchange rate changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will present data.
Section 3 will analyze the data. Section 4 will conclude.
Data
We consider 13 countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela, and take monthly data on nominal interest rates, nominal exchange rates, and price levels over the period January 1990−December 2003 (the only available) from IMF's International Financial Statistics. The central bank (legal) independence index employed is that of Jacome and Vasquez (2005) . This index takes into account not only economic and political sovereignty (as in Cukierman, 1992) but also financial sovereignty, responsibility, transparency, and the role of the central bank as a lender in the last resort.
Analysis
Latin American countries recently pursued more central bank independence through major reforms, most noticeably in Argentina (1992 and 2002 ), Bolivia (1995 ), Chile (1989 , Colombia (1992 ), Costa Rica (1995 , Mexico (1993 ), Paraguay (1995 ), Peru (1993 , Uruguay (1995 ), and Venezuela (1992 . Table 1 shows the countries' central bank intervention index taking into account those reforms. Reform countries are indicated with either "0" (pre-reform subperiod) or "1" (post-reform subperiod). We assessed the relationship between central bank independence and intervention employing both individual country estimation (Table 2 ) and cross-country estimation through panel data (Table 3) .
Policy rule (1) was used to proxy for intervention in individual country estimation. The intervention coefficients employed were obtained by individually estimating (via OLS) equation (1) for every country (Table 2 ). In Table 2 , ∆ is a series' first differences in natural logs, and D is the deviation of the real exchange rate from the PPP value of one. Estimates in the regressions of Table 2 were backed by standard econometric treatment. To preventing spourious regressions, ADF and Phillips-Perron tests were employed in order to check for stationarity. We also run a CUSUM test to check for parameter stability. Moreover, whenever autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in residuals were detected, they were fixed through Newey-West correction.
That leaning against the wind is the usual type of intervention can be seen in the negative sign of the deviations of the real exchange rate from its PPP value of one in the regressions for Argentina (1), Bolivia (1), Brazil, Chile, Colombia (0 and 1), Paraguay
(1), Peru, and Venezuela (0 and 1) ( Table 2 ). The positive sign of the regressions in Table 2 refers to the countries with leaning-with-the-wind intervention.
Countries experiencing crises over the period were Argentina (2002), Colombia (1998 −1999 ), Dominican Republic (2002 −2003 , Mexico (1995) , Uruguay (2002 ), and Venezuela (1994 −1995 . For these countries we considered banking crisis dummies.
But these alone can lead to an omitted variable bias because the central bank reforms after the crises were usually part of broader structural reforms that included privatizations, trade reform, and other structural macro policies (Jacome and Vasquez, 2005) . To circumvent this bias, we considered the index of structural reform of the Inter-American Development Bank as an extra control variable (Lora, 2001; Lora and Panizza, 2002) .
The four panels in Table 3 [4] took all those into account. Apart from the dummy for banking crisis, Table 3 shows that the variables were related at a significance level of up 10 percent. Thus the proposition that increased central bank independence can be associated with lesser intervention in foreign exchange markets holds for Latin America. Also, the structural reforms helped to reduce the need for foreign exchange intervention. The banking crises did not matter for intervention, however. Indeed the R 2 in regression [3] suggests that nearly 79 percent of the changes occurring in the intervention coefficient can be explained solely by the independence and structural reform indices.
Conclusion
The experience of 13 Latin American countries suggests that greater central bank independence can be associated with both (1) lesser intervention in the foreign exchange market and (2) leaning-against-the-wind intervention. These findings are in accordance with previous ones for industrialized countries. However, such studies relied on OLS cross-country regressions and foreign reserves as a proxy for intervention. Rather than using reserves, we assessed the relationship between central bank independence and intervention employing both individual-country estimation (via a policy rule) and crosscountry estimation through panel data. Incidentally, we also found that the structural reforms that occurred in Latin America helped to reduce the need for foreign exchange intervention. 1990 −1992 BOL−0 1990 −1995 BRA 1990 −2003 COL−0 1990 −1992 CRC−0 1990 −1995 GUA 1990 −2003 DOM 1990 −2003 MEX−0 1990 PAR−0 1990 −1995 PER−0 1990 URU−0 1990 −1995 VEN−0 1990 −1992 Note Reform countries are indicated with either "0" (pre-reform subperiod) or "1" (post-reform subperiod) CBII is the central bank independence index Source: Jacome and Vasquez (2005) 
